The proposed China-Myanmar-Bangladesh Economic Corridor (CMBC) could create fresh opportunities for trade, investment and regional integration, but analysts say Bangladesh must carefully assess its economic, security and geopolitical implications before committing to the project.
The proposal regained momentum following Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s visit to China in June, during which Dhaka and Beijing issued their third joint communiqué since establishing diplomatic relations in 1975. Among the key issues discussed was the China-Myanmar-Bangladesh Economic Corridor, envisaged as a road and rail network linking Kunming in China’s Yunnan province with Bangladesh’s ports via Myanmar.
For China, the corridor would provide a shorter route to the Indian Ocean, reducing dependence on the strategically sensitive Strait of Malacca. Bangladesh, meanwhile, stands to benefit from improved connectivity, greater investment, expanded trade and new employment opportunities.
The initiative, however, is a revived version of the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) corridor proposed in 1999. India later withdrew from the project over concerns about China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Beijing’s expanding regional influence, leaving the corridor to evolve without New Delhi’s participation.
Analysts say the proposal presents Bangladesh with both opportunities and difficult choices as it seeks to maintain balanced relations with China, India, the United States, and other key partners.
China has shown strong interest in moving the project forward. Chinese Ambassador Yao Wen recently said officials were preparing a roadmap for the corridor, while Beijing has continued engaging with different stakeholders in Myanmar to protect its strategic and economic interests.
Despite close economic ties, Bangladesh’s trade relationship with China remains heavily skewed. In 2024, Bangladesh imported goods worth about $22.8 billion from China while exporting only around $1.2 billion, resulting in a merchandise trade deficit of nearly $21.7 billion.
Experts caution that better transport links alone are unlikely to narrow this gap. Without stronger industrial capacity and more competitive exports, Bangladesh could end up importing even more Chinese products rather than significantly increasing its own exports.
They note that Bangladesh’s export earnings still rely heavily on garments and other labour-intensive industries, while China continues to dominate global manufacturing through advanced technology, integrated supply chains and large-scale production.
Connectivity, they argue, is only one part of economic development. Bangladesh has made significant progress through infrastructure projects such as the Padma Bridge, but challenges remain in freight transport, logistics, warehousing, customs procedures and multimodal transport. Unless these bottlenecks are removed, the country risks serving mainly as a transit route instead of becoming a regional manufacturing and trading hub.
The financial implications also deserve close scrutiny. Large infrastructure projects require substantial investment, long-term maintenance and commercially viable operations. Economists say every major investment should be evaluated against competing national priorities such as port modernisation, export infrastructure, climate resilience, healthcare, education and industrial development.
Security remains perhaps the biggest obstacle to the corridor’s implementation.
The proposed route would pass through Myanmar’s conflict-ridden Rakhine State, where fighting has continued since the military takeover in 2021. The Arakan Army now controls or influences much of the territory through which the corridor would run, creating serious uncertainty for long-term infrastructure projects.
The ongoing Rohingya crisis adds another layer of complexity. Bangladesh continues to host around 1.2 million Rohingyas, and analysts argue that any regional connectivity initiative should not undermine efforts to ensure their safe, voluntary and dignified repatriation.
Some experts also warn that infrastructure passing through conflict zones could unintentionally strengthen armed groups by creating new sources of revenue or influence, making comprehensive security assessments essential before any commitments are made.
The corridor also has wider geopolitical implications.
India remains wary of projects that could expand China’s presence near its sensitive northeastern region and the Siliguri Corridor, while the United States has encouraged Bangladesh to preserve its strategic balance as economic ties between Dhaka and Washington continue to deepen.
Analysts therefore believe Bangladesh should judge the proposal solely on the basis of its national interests rather than geopolitical competition.
Lessons from projects such as the China-Laos Railway, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port show that infrastructure alone cannot guarantee economic success. Transparent financing, careful feasibility studies, strong institutions and a competitive domestic economy are equally important.
Experts suggest Bangladesh adopt a gradual approach by prioritising smaller and more practical connectivity projects while treating the proposed corridor as a long-term possibility. They also recommend reducing the trade imbalance with China by attracting more export-oriented Chinese investment instead of relying primarily on imports.
At the same time, they say Bangladesh should establish clear national guidelines on debt sustainability, environmental protection, labour standards and security so that all future connectivity projects serve the country’s long-term interests.
While the proposed corridor could strengthen Bangladesh’s role in regional connectivity, analysts say its ultimate success will depend not on the roads and railways themselves but on the country’s ability to build a stronger, more competitive and resilient economy.
